[ratelimits] RRL vs other approaches
paul at redbarn.org
Tue Feb 19 15:02:13 UTC 2013
Jared Mauch wrote:
> On Feb 19, 2013, at 8:48 AM, Edward Lewis wrote:
> Sending back TC to "authenticate" clients would likely help reduce the abuse of 'udp any'
no. really. not. the subsequent udp queries you would prospectively
receive following a successful tcp session in the above scenario need
not be truly sourced. using a successful tcp session as a gate to a
lightweight udp session is entirely wrong in terms of protecting
spoofed-source victims from your orbiting death ray projector. (i'm
touchy about this since i had the same idea and vernon had to straighten
me out on the subject.)
> I was "forced" to rebuild my dns server in the past week or so.. I have not built-in the rrl patch yet as part of the running server and have noticed that the CPU usage is significantly lower. (Instead of "150%" it's about 50% of a core).
> Right now I'm debating if it makes sense to continue to patch w/ rrl due to the much higher "cost" (2-3x)
as warren said, this sounds like pilot error or measurement failure.
your cpu costs under RRL should be far lower during an attack since
you're avoiding the response marshalling cost, and should be about the
same during non-attack since the hash table is preallocated and the
hashing is pretty quick. please investigate your claim above, and report
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