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</head><body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">does anyone believe that
worldwide adoption of a "let's turn off UDP/ANY for security reasons"
would remove this capability from enough servers in the policy's first
25 years to make any difference?<br>
<br>
of such believers, do any also believe that the attackers will be unable
or unwilling to find an alternative query?<br>
<br>
security economics tells us not to bother building defenses whose cost
is higher than the attackers' cost of evading them.<br>
<br>
see <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maginot_Line"><http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maginot_Line></a>.<br>
<br>
paul<br>
<br>
re:<br>
<br>
Tony Finch wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:alpine.LSU.2.00.1303060938590.27013@hermes-1.csi.cam.ac.uk"
type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Edward Lewis <a class="moz-txt-link-rfc2396E" href="mailto:Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz"><Ed.Lewis@neustar.biz></a> wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite"><pre wrap="">Now, that is not alone a reason to "lose" a feature. The reason we want
to "lose" UDP/ANY comes from the observation that it has become to be a
tool of malicious behavior in a way that far out-weighs the earnest use.
</pre></blockquote>
<pre wrap=""><!---->
The same could be said of SMTP...
Tony.
</pre>
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